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F AMIL Y LAW-COURT-ORDERED SURGERY FOR THE PROTECTION

FETus-Jefferson v. Gr!!fin Spalding County Hospital
Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
OF A VIABLE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Jefferson v. Gr!!fin Spalding County Hospital Authority,l the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a lower court's decision ordering
a pregnant woman to submit to a caesarean section if necessary to
protect her thirty-nine week old fetus. 2 The court held that as a mat
ter of law the viable fetus 3 was entitled to the protection of the Juve
nile Court Code of Georgia4 and, because of the mother's refusal to
submit to recommended surgery, was without proper parental care
and subsistence necessary to sustain life. 5 The court granted tempo
rary custody of the fetus to the Georgia Department of Human Re
sources with full authority to consent to any necessary medical
procedures. 6
Historically, medical refusal cases have arisen in two contents:
cases in which the treatment is intended for the unwilling patient's
own benefit? and those in which the patient is a minor child or other
type of incompetent whose parent or guardian withholds consent. 8
These categories have each generated substantial and well developed
bodies of law. In Jefferson, however, a pregnant woman's refusal of
medical treatment necessary to save the life of her fetus presented
the Georgia Supreme Court with a unique legal dilemma for which
there was surprisingly little authority upon which to base a decision.
This situation, while generally related to the established lines of au
thority for medical refusal cases, is nevertheless validly distinguish
able from both. 9 Furthermore, the problem has taken on a new
I. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
2. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
3. The meaning of "viable," as used in this note, is that set forth in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), specifically, the point in development at which the fetus is poten
tially able to live outside of the mother. Id. at 160. No attempt will be made within this
note to deal with the practical problems which may arise from this definition.
4. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A (1981).
5. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 12-46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
9. In a study of Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
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dimension in the wake of the Supreme Court of the United States'
principal abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 10 which significantly
reevaluated the legal status of fetal life. I I
This note will first survey the areas of medical refusal law most
relevant to the problem of a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment.
This discussion will be followed by an analysis of the current legal
status of the unborn and the degree of protection given to the unborn
by various courts. Jefferson, which combines both fields of law, will
then be analyzed with respect to the finding that the juvenile court
had jurisdiction over the fetus, the ultimate decision to order surgery
upon the mo~her, and the propriety, in the context of current law, of
both decisions. The final segment of the note will focus upon the
implications of Jefferson to the disposition of similar future cases.
II.
A.

ApPLICABLE LAW

The Right to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment

Court ordered medical treatment intended to protect a fetus
necessarily involves a physical invasion of the mother, thus invoking
the body of law dealing with a competent adult's right to refuse
treatment upon his or her body. On the other hand, the intended
beneficiary of the treatment is not the mother, but rather the fetus,
which is being denied life-saving care by the mother's refusal. In
this sense, the situation resembles those cases in which a parent with
holds consent to treatment upon a child. Both lines of authority
therefore bear some relationship to a pregnant woman's refusal of
treatment.
1.

The Competent Adult's Right to Refuse Treatment

It generally has been held that absent some pressing state inter
est, a competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment upon
421,201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), a case, which likeJ~erson, involved
court ordered treatment upon a pregnant woman to save the life of her fetus, the author
noted: "The principal case, however, does not fit directly in either of these categories;
rather it contains elements of each." Note, Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion 
New Jersey Supreme Court Orders Pregnant Jehovah Witness to Consent to Blood Transfu
sion to Save Unborn Child, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 80, 84 (1964).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
II. In this note, the term "fetus" rather than "unborn child" will be used to refer
generally to the unborn. The term "child" has special legal significance, and its applica
tion to the unborn may be wholly inappropriate in the legal context. The term "fetus,"
on the other hand, is scientifically accurate as applied to the unborn beyond the first few
weeks of development and is not presently a legal term of art. Thus, it appears to be the
more legally neutral of the two.
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his or her body.12 The cases so holding have been based most fre
quently on the patient's right of privacy,13 free practice of religion, 14
and the common law right to self-determination and bodily con
trol. IS None of these bases of refusal are absolute, however, and they
are all subject to balancing against conflicting state interests and in
12. See, e.g., In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976), in which the court stated:
As a general rule, every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body and cannot be subjected to
medical treatment without his consent. Specifically, where there is no compel
ling State interest which justifies overriding an adult patient's decision not to
receive blood transfusions because of religious beliefs, such transfusions should
not be ordered.
Id. at 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citations omitted). See also Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving
Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. I (1975); Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preserva
tion of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold
Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980); Note, The Refusal of Life-SaVing Medical Treatment vs.
The State's Interest in the Preservation ofLife: A Clar!fication ofthe Interests at Stake, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 85 (1980). For general case discussion see generally Karnezis, Patient's
Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (1979);
Stasi, Power of Courts or Other Public Agencies, in the Absence of Statutory Authority, to
Order Compulsory Medical Care for Adult, 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
13. See, e.g., In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973), in which the court stated:
"[T1he constitutional right of privacy includes the right of a mature competent adult to
refuse to accept medical recommendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a
third person at least, appear to be in his best interests." Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
See generally supra note 12 and articles cited therein. The constitutional right of privacy
is not an enumerated right, but rather a recently emerging concept which first was articu
lated fully in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United
States Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights create
"zones of privacy," and that a resulting constitutional right of privacy is therefore a legit
imate one. Id. at 484-85. This right later served as the basis of the Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the Court held that the right of privacy is
broad enough to include a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 153. See
also infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
14. Some religions forbid their practitioners to receive certain types of medical
treatment. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses believe that blood transfusions violate the
teaching of several scriptural passages which condemn the "eating" of blood. See Ford,
Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212, 212 (1964).
When faced with court ordered treatment, patients refusing treatment on religious
grounds have based their legal argument on the first amendment guarantee of free prac
tice of religion, and frequently, the courts have upheld the the patient's right to refuse.
See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361,
205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974,390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976). See generally Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom:
Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. I (1975); Note, Compulsory Medical Treat
men.' and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1967) .
. " 15. For detailed discussion, see Clarke, supra note 12, at 797-800.
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fringement upon the rights of others. 16 Even those courts that have
upheld the patient's right to refuse treatment have been quick to re
affirm that in certain circumstances, state interests may overcome the
patient's right.t7 For example, in In re Me/ideo ,18 the New York trial
court held that life-saving blood transfusions could not be forced
upon the unwilling adult patient, but noted further that 'judicial
power to order compulsory medical treatment over an adult patient's
objection exists in some situations."19 While the Me/ideo court ana
lyzed the various bases of possible overriding state interests,20 it con
eluded that no such interests were present. 21
Generally, courts have not been hesitant to override a compe
tent adult's right to refuse treatment in the presence of a state interest
based on the life, health, and welfare of others. An illustration of
such a situation is that in which the unwilling patient is the parent of
a dependent minor child whose welfare would be jeopardized by the
parent's death. 22 The state's interest under these circumstances has
been said to arise under the doctrine ofparens patriae. 23 Basically,
parens patriae refers to the right and duty of the state to exercise its
power to protect those unable to protect themselves. The doctrine is
most often applied to minors and other incompetents. 24 Since al
16. See id., supra note 12, at 812. As to free practice of religion, courts throughout
the history of our constitutional law have placed restrictions on this right, particularly in
situations in which religious practices have conflicted with public welfare. See, e.g.,
David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Both cases were cited by Justice Smith in Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 91, 274 S.E.2d at 461
(Smith, J., concurring). As to the right of privacy, the Court in Roe specifically held that
this is not an absolute right and may be limited in the face of a compelling state interest.
410 U.S. at 154. Roe also spoke to the right of self determination and bodily control
saying that the right to do with one's own body as one pleases has never been recognized
as an unlimited right. Id.
17. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lane
v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (1978) (citing Superinten
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977»; In
re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
18. 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
19. Id at 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citations omitted).
20. See infra notes 23-46.
21. 88 Misc. 2d at 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
22. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), urt. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752 (D. Conn. 1965); Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976).
23. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975,
390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d I (1955), in which the court
stated:
This parens patriae jurisdiction is a right of sovereignty and imposes a duty on
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lowing the parent to die would be to allow that parent to abandon
his or her child, courts, on the basis of parens patriae, have been
willing to order treatment necessary to save the parent's life. 25 Court
ordered treatment, in this situation, does not require that the patient
be the only surviving parent. 26
The state's interest in protecting minor children is the most typi
cal example of an interest of sufficient magnitude to override a com
petent adult's right to refuse medical treatment. Another situation in
which sufficient state interest has been found to exist is that in which
a pregnant woman refuses treatment necessary for the life of her fe
tus. This was the factual setting of Jefferson. Prior to Jefferson,
however, the only reported case to deal specifically with this problem
was Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson. 27
Although Raleigh was similar in many respects to Jefferson, it was
decided long before the United States Supreme Court reevaluated
the legal status of the fetus in Roe.
In Raleigh, a woman more than thirty-two weeks pregnant re
fused blood transfusions. Her refusal was based on her beliefs as a
Jehovah's Witness. 28 The transfusions were necessary to save both
her life and that of her fetus. 29 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the lower court's holding that the judiciary could not interthe sovereignty to protect the public interest and to protect such persons with
disabilities who have no rightful protector. . . . [T)he power and duty imposed
by the parens palriae doctrine . . . extends to the personal liberty of persons
who are under a disability whether by reason of infancy, incompetency, habit
ual drunkenness, imbecility, etc.
Id. at 430, 114 A.2d at 5 (emphasis in original).
25. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., -331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.). cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), an opinion frequently cited for its
insight into the various interests and policies involved in medical refusal cases. Judge
Wright, after noting that the patient in question was the mother of a seven-month-old
child, stated:
The state, as parens palriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it
should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The patient
had a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus the people
had an interest in preserving the life of this mother.
Id. at 1008. Presence of minor children has not been considered sufficient reason to
order treatment in all cases. See, e.g. ,In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972), in which
the court determined that the future well-being of the patient's children had been ade
quately assured, and that consequently, the state's interest did not override the patient's
right to refuse treatment. Id. at 375.
26. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1002 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
27. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537. cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
28. Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 537-38.
29. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
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vene, and ordered the treatment purely on the basis of the state's
concern for the fetus, stating:
We have no difficulty in so deciding with respect to the infant
child. The more difficult question is whether an adult may be
compelled to submit to such medical procedures when necessary
to save his life. Here we think it unnecessary to decide that ques
tion in broad terms because the welfare of the child and mother
are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be impracticable
to attempt to distinguish between them with respect to the sundry
factual patterns which may develop.3o

The Raleigh court rested its decision on related bodies of law
because of the complete absence of directly applicable precedent. 31
The court relied principally on State v. Perricone,32 a New Jersey
case in which blood transfusions were ordered given to a minor child
after the child's parent refused consent on religious grounds. 33 Tra
ditionally, the power to order medical treatment in the absence of
parental consent is rooted in the doctrine ofparens patriae. 34 Al
though the Raleigh court did not specifically mention parens patriae,
it implicitly extended the doctrine to the protection of the unbom. 35
The court cited an additional New Jersey case36 which stated that a
child could sue for injuries negligently inflicted prior to birth.37
Clearly, the court wished to establish that the fetus was a legally in
dependent being with a right to live. 38 In doing so, the court more
closely equated the fetus' legal status to that of a live-born child. In
30.
31.

fd.
For analysis of Raleigh, see Note, supra note 9; Note, Health - Compulsion

of

Adult of Sound Judgment to Submit to Blood Tranifusions in Spite ofReligious Objections,
40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 126 (1964); Note, Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion 
Blood TransfUSions May Be Administered to Expectant Mother Despite Her Religious Ob
jections!fNecessary to Save Her Lifo or That of Her Child, 10 VILL. L. REV. 140 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Villanova Note).
32. 37 N.J. 463, lSI A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. S90 (1962). See 42 N.J. at 423,
201 A.2d at 53S.
33. 37 N.J. at 4S0, lSI A.2d at 760.
34. See supra notes 23-24 & infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
35. One Raleigh commentator expressed the point in this way: "The instant case,
then, as regards the infant in the womb, represents a significant extension of the parens
patriae doctrine insofar as it declares that transfusions may be administered to the
mother, against her will, in order to save the baby's life." Villanova Note, supra note 31,
at 143 (emphasis in original).
36. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). See 42 N.J. at 423, 201
A.2d at 538.
37. 31 N.J. at 368, 157 A.2d at 503.
38. Villanova Note, supra note 31, at 144. As to whether a fetus has constitutional
rights, see notes infra 55-64 and accompanying text.
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this way, the court effectively enhanced the relevance of Perricone .39
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, courts have been will
ing to compel treatment for the competent adult patient in order to
protect the life, health and welfare of others. Yet a more difficult
question for the courts has been whether the state has sufficient inter
est in the life of a patient, absent concern for third parties, to order
life-saving treatment. Several courts and commentators have ob
served a general state interest in the sanctity and preservation of
human life that can be applied to the patient, independent of con
cern for others, and weighed against his or her right to refuse treat
ment. 40 In actual practice, however, this factor has been given very
little weight, and most courts have been unwilling to order treatment
upon a competent adult patient whose refusal does not invoke some
other state interest. 41
39. Although Raleigh is the only reported case of its kind prior to Jiff'erson, the
problem of a pregnant woman's refusal of medical treatment has been by no means so
rare in the medical community. Several writings in medical journals have dealt specifi
cally with this problem in the hospital setting. See, e.g., Lieberman, Mazor, Chaim &
Cohen, The Fetal Right to Live, 53 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 515 (1979); Shriner,
Maternal Versus Fetal Rights - A Clinical Dilemma, 53 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
518 (1979). These articles deal primarily with the concerns of attending physicians when
faced with a pregnant woman's refusal of medical treatment. At least one unreported
case dealt directly with this problem, and as in Raleigh, a sufficient state interest was
found to support an order of treatment upon the mother. See Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal
Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOL
OGY 209 (1981). This article discusses an unreported Colorado case in which the mother
ultimately was ordered to submit to a caesarean section so that the life of her fetus could
be saved. This case appears in many respects to be quite similar to Jiff'erson in that the
juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over a viable fetus so that the mother could be or
dered to submit to the surgery. See 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
40. See, e.g. , Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728,741,370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). See also Clarke, supra note 12, at 815-16.
41. See, e.g., In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962). See also Clarke,
supra note 12, at 816. Although the state's interest in the unwilling adult patient's own
life, as a wholly independent consideration, has not been sufficient alone to override the
patient's right to refuse treatment, this factor has been given considerable weight in the
unusual situation in which the unwilling patient has a strong subjective desire to live.
This situation has arisen occasionally in Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion cases in
which the patient clearly wanted to live and would accept the treatment if ordered by the
court but could not in good conscience give willing consent. See In re President & Direc
tors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964). One author has suggested that the patient objects to consenting to the treat
ment, not to the treatment itself. Byrn, supra note 12, at 15. The patient, by using all
convenient but non-violent means to resist, does not offend God if the treatment is ulti
matelyadministered. Id. at 15 n.55. The resulting dilemma was perhaps best illustrated
in Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), in which Judge Jacob Markowitz, in his often-quoted closing re
marks, exclaimed:
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A somewhat different state interest considered in the medical
refusal context pertains to physicians and hospitals. 42 More specifi
cally, the interest lies in protecting the medical community from le
gal liability and in guarding the ethical integrity of the profession. 43
This state interest, however, is another example of one which in ac
tual practice will not, in itself, overcome the patient's right to refuse
treatment. 44 Courts citing this interest in their decisions to order
treatment have consistently required at least one additional state in
terest. 4S One court specifically stated that the patient's rights in this
regard are superior to the interests of the physicians and hospitals. 46
2.

The Parental Consent Cases: The Right to Withhold
Treatment

Another line of medical refusal cases that courts may consider
How legalistic minded our society has become, and what an ultra-legalistic
maze we have created to the extent that society and the individual have become
enmeshed and paralyzed by its unrealistic entanglements!
I was reminded of "The Fall" by Camus, and I knew that no release - no
legalistic absolution - would absolve me or the Court from responsibility if I,
speaking for the Court, answered "No" to the question Am I my brother's
keeper? This woman wanted to live. I could not let her die!
Id. at 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 452. Although the decision to order treatment in Powell
appears to have been based solely on the court's desire to save the patient's life for her
own sake, the court did at least mention that she was the mother of six children. Id. at
215,267 N.Y.S.2d at 451. This may well have been a factor in the court's decision, and it
remains unclear, therefore, whether the state's interest in the patient's life, standing alone
and without some other state interest, would ever be sufficient to override the patient's
refusal. Indeed, more recently, courts dealing with Jehovah's Witnesses blood transfu
sion cases have upheld the patient's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g. , In re Melideo, 88
Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
42. See generally Clarke, supra note 12, at 817-20; Note, supra note 12, at 102-03.
43. Note, supra note 12, at 102-03.
44. A recent study argues that as to civil liability, the competent patient will gener
ally sign a waiver of responsibility. Id. As to the ethical integrity of the profession, the
same study notes that medical ethics do not always require treatment, and, in any case,
the patient's right would outweigh ethical considerations. Id. As another commentator
has noted in the same regard, the ethical integrity issue involves merely a moral question
while the patient's refusal of treatment involves a definite legal right, the latter of which
is given more weight. Clarke, supra note 12, at 818-19.
45. See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), in which
the court, in its decision to order treatment, noted a concern for the conscience of the
physicians, id. at 754, but also observed that the patient was the father of four children.
Id. at 753. See also In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), in which the concern for the doctors
and hospitals was among numerous state interests advanced by the court in its decision to
order treatment. Id. at 1007-09.
46. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743
44,370 N.E.2d 417,427 (1977).
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when confronted with a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment is
that in which a parent withholds consent for treatment of a minor
child.47 The common thread between this line of authority and the
problem presented in Jefferson and Raleigh is that the intended ben
eficiary of the treatment is not the recalcitrant adult, but rather the
child or fetus, as the case may be, who has no control over his or her
own fate. 48
The power of the state to protect minor children from parental
neglect and abuse underlies the reasoning in this line of cases. His
torically, such power has been based on the state's role as parens pa
triae .49 Accordingly, states have enacted statutes establishing special
courts with jurisdiction over matters involving the welfare of minors
and empowering these courts to intervene on behalf of minors within
their jurisdiction. 50 Not surprisingly, these and other child protec
tive statutes have been invoked in cases dealing with parental with
holding of consent to treatment necessary for the life of the child. 5 I
Indeed, in life and death circumstances, courts consistently have or
dered the necessary treatment or upheld treatment already adminis
tered regardless of the parent's grounds for refusal.5 2 In non-life
threatening cases, the parent's refusal occasionally has been up
held. 53 The relative scarcity of cases upholding a parent's right to
47. See, e.g., People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cerl.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820
(1955); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128,263 N.Y.S. 552 (I 933);In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948,
25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338,292 A.2d 387 (1972).
48. As previously mentioned, the Raleigh court did use such a case as authority.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Today, the relevance of this line of authority
necessarily will depend on the present legal status of the fetus. See supra notes 31-38 and
accompanying text.
49. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475,181 A.2d 751, 758 (1962). For a definition
ofparens palriae see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-2 (West
1952).
51. See, e.g., People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769,
773, cerl. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 477,181 A.2d 751,
759 (1962).
52. Clark, supra note 12, at 810 n.70. An often-cited illustrative case is People ex
rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cerl. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952), in
which a child, whose parent refused to consent to blood transfusions for the child, was
held to be neglected. Id. at 624, 104 N.E.2d at 773. The court upheld an order ap
pointing a guardian to consent to the treatment. Id. at 626-27, 104 N.E.2d at 774.
53. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), in which the parent of
a child suffering from a spinal collapse refused remedial surgery on the grounds that the
surgery would require blood transfusions in violation of the mother's beliefs as a Jeho
vah's Witness. Id. at 340, 292 A.2d at 388. The court held that as the child's life was not
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withhold consent to treatment for a child, as compared to those up
holding an adult's right to refuse treatment on his or her own body,
makes it clear that the former right is much more limited .
. B.

The Legal Status ofFetal Life Since Roe v. Wade

The relevance of the parental consent cases to the issue of a
pregnant woman's refusal of treatment necessarily will depend on
the legal status of the fetus. The closer the fetus' legal status is to
that of a live-born child, the greater relevance the parental consent
cases will have. The Raleigh court did not hesitate to cite as author
ity a case in which treatment was ordered upon a minor child despite
lack of parental consent, and the court, therefore, found its decision
to be an easy one. 54 Since Raleigh, however, the legal status of the
unborn has been redefined substantially by Roe.
In Roe, the Court held that a fetus is not a person in the consti
tutional sense. 55 Nevertheless, the state has an interest in potential
human life and, when the fetus reaches viability, that interest be
comes "compelling."56 Since the mother's right of privacy, on which
her prerogative to terminate the pregnancy is based, can be overrid
den by a compelling state interest, 57 the state accordingly may pro
hibit abortion of a viable fetus except as necessary to protect the life
and health of the mother. 58
Subsequent to Roe, the legal status of the viable fetus remains
unsettled with regard to matters other than abortion. 59 If the viable
fetus is not a person, it has no rights as such and viability represents
merely the point at which the state's interest in the fetus is vindi
cated. 60 The proposition that the viable fetus is not the legal
equivalent of a live-born child is strengthened by the Roe Court's
immediately imperiled, the state did not have sufficient interest to overcome the parent's
refusal. Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
54. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
55. 4\0 U.S. at 158. By this holding, the Court denied the fetus the protection of
the fourteenth amendment, the result being that a fetus has no constitutional right to life.
56. Id. at 163.
57. Id. at 154-55. Based on the notion that even fundamental rights are not abso
lute, the Court held that the right of privacy could be limited by a compelling state
interest. I d.
58. Id. at 163-64.
59. Although the Roe Court held that a state may prohibit the abortion of a viable
fetus, id., the Court gave no indication as to what other statutory measures might be
taken by states, for example, to safeguard the life or even general health of the viable
fetus.
60. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Needfor a Life-Protective Amend
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1250, 13\0 (1975). It has been argued that in various fields of
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holding that the state cannot prohibit abortion of a viable fetus when
an abortion is necessary for the mother's life and health. 61 While the
Roe Court indicated that the state may give at mi'limum some meas
ure of protection to the viable fetus,62 the Court provided no real
working basis from which to assess exactly what extent of protection
might be given. 63 Not surprisingly, the matter remains unclear. 64
In post-Roe decisions, the protection given to the viable unborn
has varied considerably, especially with regard to statutory protec
tion. For example, in Reyes v. Superior Court ,65 a felony child-en
dangering statute was held not applicable to the unborn. 66 In Reyes,
a mother continued to use heroin during the last two months ofpreg
nancy and, consequently, her twins were born addicted to the drug. 67
The court applied its holding to the unborn in general68 and made
no viability distinction. In noncriminal proceedings, however, courts
have been quite willing to use the Roe emphasis on viability to jus
tify statutory protection of the unborn. For example, in Bowland v.
Municipal Court,69 a statute prohibiting the unlicensed practice of
the healing arts was held applicable to the practice of midwifery.7°
The Bowland court stated that "mor the same policy reasons for
which the Legislature may prohibit the abortion of unborn children
who have reached the point of viability, it may require that those
who assist in childbirth have valid licenses."71 Indeed in Jtjferson,
law, courts have never accorded full legal rights to the unborn. See Note, Live Birth: A
Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 836 (1976).
61. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
62. Id.
63. King, The Juridical Status ofthe Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection ofthe
Unborn,77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1648 (1979).
64. King provides an informative discussion of the uncertain legal status of the
fetus. She concludes that although Roe v. Wade was not adequately reasoned, id. at
1657, the viability criterion nevertheless "strikes a fair balance between the competing
interests of developing and mature humans." Id. at 1649. She notes further that there
are no legal obstacles to giving the viable fetus the full protection given to the newly
born. Id. at 1678.
65. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
66. The statute at issue was CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1970). The court
demonstrates that in other criminal statutes, the terms "human being" and "minor child"
have been held not to include the unborn. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
It was also noted that to hold the statute applicable to a fetus would lead to an anoma
lous result, that is, that endangering the fetus would be punished more severely than
aborting it. Id. at 218, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
67. Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
68. /d. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
69. 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976).
70. Id. at 486-87, 556 P.2d at 1084, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
71. Id. at 495,556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The viability standard has
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the viability criterion again has been the rationale for extending di
rect statutory protection to the unbom.72
III.
A.

JEFFERSON V. GRIFFIN SPALDING COUNTY HOSPITAL
AUTHORITY

Facts and Holding

Jesse Mae Jefferson, a woman thirty-nine weeks pregnant, had
been an out-patient at the Griffin Spalding County Hospital for pre
natal care. 73 Her examining physician determined that she was suf
fering from a condition known as "placenta previa" in which the
placenta covers the opening of the birth canaP4 The physician fur
ther noted that this condition almost never corrects itself and if natu
ral childbirth was attempted, there would be a ninety-nine percent
chance that the fetus would not survive and that the mother's
chances for survival would be no better than fifty percent,75 Deliv
ery by caesarean section, however, if performed prior to labor, would
have given both the mother and her fetus an almost certain chance of
survival,76 Ms. Jefferson, on the basis of her religious beliefs,77 re
fused both the surgery and any ensuing blood transfusions. 78
On January 22, 1981, the hospital petitioned the Superior Court
of Butts County, Georgia for an order authorizing the necessary proalso been applied to the interpretation of wrongful death statutes enabling a parent to
recover for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. See, e.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 361, 331 N.E.2d 916,920 (1975); Presley v. Newport Hosp., II7 R.1.
177, 192-93,365 A.2d 748, 756 (1976) (Bevilacqua, c.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). See also Note, Torts - Wrongful Death - A Viable Fetus is a "Person "for Purposes
of the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 266 (1977). This broad
statutory application of the viability standard in wrongful death cases is of doubtful rele
vance here, however, since allowing an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus
relates not to the interests of the fetus, but rather to the interests of the parents, that is,
compensation for injury. See id. at 273. See also Note, supra note 60, at 829-30.
72. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
73. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
74. Id.
75. A newspaper report of the case explained that when a woman with placenta
previa goes into labor, the placenta tears loose from the uterine wall, usually killing the
fetus and at the same time causing loss of blood to the mother. Atlanta Journal/Consti
tution, Jan. 24, 1981, at I-A, col. 3.
76. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
77. Ms. Jefferson was apparently a member of a Baptist church which teaches di
vine healing. See Atlanta Constitution, Feb. II, 1981, at C-l, col. 2. The reported opin
ion indicated that only religious grounds were offered for the refusal. 247 Ga. at 88, 274
S.E.2d at 459. Newspaper reports, however, indicated that at sometime during the pro
ceeding, the right of privacy and a fear of the surgery itself were also asserted. See
Atlanta Journal/Constitution, Jan. 24, 1981, at I-A, col. 3.
78. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
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cedures. 79 In an emergency hearing the same day, the superior court
found that the fetus was viable,80 that the lives of the mother and her
fetus were inseparable, and that the hospital was required by its own
policy to treat any patient in need of emergency treatment. 81 The
court then authorized the necessary procedures effective only if Ms.
Jefferson were to appear at the hospital for emergency delivery.82
The court declined to order her to submit to surgery on any other
basis but invited any appropriate state agency to intervene or file a
separate suit. 83
The following day, the Georgia Department of Human Re
sources, alleging that the child was deprived and without proper
care, petitioned the Juvenile Court of Butts County for temporary
custody of the fetus and an order for Ms. Jefferson to submit to a
caesarean section. 84 The superior court, concerned that the powers of
the juvenile court standing alone would be insufficient to provide the
requested relief, consolidated the cases and upon a joint hearing ren
dered its judgment both as juvenile court, with regard to the fetus,
and as superior court, with regard to the mother.85 First, the court
decided the issue of the juvenile court's jurisdiction stating:
[T]he Court concludes and finds as a matter of law that this child
is a viable human being and entitled to the protection of the Juve
nile Court Code of Georgia. The Court concludes that this child
is without proper parental care and subsistence necessary for his
or her physical life and health. 86

Then, in its capacity as the juvenile court, the court granted tempo
79. Id.
80. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458. The court noted further that to abort the viable
fetus would be a criminal offense under GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201, 26-1202 (1981). Id.
8!. 247 Ga. at 86-87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
82. Id. The court's concern for the hospital policy seems to relate to the state's
interest in the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See supra notes 42-46. See a/so
United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), where the court, in upholding
previously ordered blood transfusions, said:
[T]he doctor's conscience and professional oath must also be respected. In the
present case the patient voluntarily submitted himself to and insisted upon
medical care. Simultaneously he sought to dictate to treating physicians a
course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice. To require these doc
tors to ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name of free
religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circumstances.
Id. at 754.
83. 247 Ga. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458-59.
84. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
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rary custody of the fetus to the Department of Human Resources
with full authority to consent to surgical delivery. Finally, under its
powers as the superior court, the court ordered Ms. Jefferson to un
dergo additional tests and, if necessary, to submit to a caesarean sec
tion and any other accompanying procedures. 87 The intrusion into
the lives of Ms. Jefferson and her husband was held to be out
weighed by the state's duty to protect the fetus. 88
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in a per
curiam opinion consisting primarily of the reports of the two earlier
proceedings. 89 As further support for its holding, the court cited ad
ditional decisions including Roe and Raleigh .90 Several concurring
opinions accompanied that of the majority.91

B. Analysis
The facts and circumstances of Jefferson presented the court
with two basic issues for resolution. First, the court was confronted
with the issue of whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the
fetus. This precise issue had not arisen previously under Georgia
law, and the court, therefore, was faced with a precedent setting deci
sion. Second, the court had to decide the more urgent question of
whether Ms. Jefferson, as a competent adult, could be ordered to
submit to surgery for the sake of the fetus.
87. Id. at 88-89, 274 S.E.2d at 459-60.
88. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
89. Id. Motion for stay to the Supreme Court of Georgia was denied. Id. The
story nevertheless had a happy ending for the Jeffersons. According to newspaper re
ports, after sheriffs deputies removed Ms. Jefferson from her home to the hospital, the
placenta previa condition slowly corrected itself before labor began, an event almost un
heard of by her doctors. A baby girl was delivered in normal childbirth. Atlanta Jour
nal/Constitution, Jan. 24,1981, at I-A, col. 3; Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 11, 1981, at C-l,
col. 2.
90. The only other citation given by the court was Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d
145 (Ky. 1969). For a discussion of this case see infra note 119.
91. Justice Hill, joined by Justice Marshall, emphasized that the power of the court
to order a competent adult to submit to surgery is exceedingly limited. 247 Ga. at 89, 274
S.E.2d at 460. With Roe cited as authority for the state's interest in the viable fetus, he
then indicated that the court's decision was one of balancing, stating: "[W]e weighed the
right of the mother to practice her religion and to refuse surgery on herself, against her
unborn child's right to live." Id. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460. As to the jurisdictional issue,
Justice Hill noted that the court had not passed on whether the jurisdiction of the juve
nile court was necessary to achieve the result, but he nevertheless agreed with the propri
ety of the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction. 247 Ga. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 461.
Justice Smith's concurring opinion is of special interest with regard to the issue of
the juvenile court's jurisdiction. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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The Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court

The Je.fferson court concluded that the viable fetus was entitled
to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia. 92 The ma
jority, however, made no attempt to analyze the Code's jurisdictional
provisions, the relevant portions of which state that "[t]he [juvenile]
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters
and shall be the sole court for initiating action ... [c]oncerning any
child."93 The term "child" is defined as "any individual who is
under the age of 17 years."94 The court, by invoking this statute as
applicable to situations in which a pregnant woman refuses medical
treatment, necessarily implied that a viable fetus is a child within the
meaning of the Code.
Not all courts have been so flexible in their statutory interpreta
tion. A Michigan court, in In re nit/rick Infant ,95 held that the legis
lature did not intend the word "child," in the child custody
provisions of the Probate Code, to include the unborn. 96 The Michi
gan statutory language read ')urisdiction ... in proceedings con
cerning any child under 17 years of age,"97 and was strictly
construed although almost identical to that of the jurisdictional pro
visions of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia. 98 Likewise, in Reyes
v. Superior Court ,99 a California felony child-endangering statute
was held not applicable to the unborn. 100 The court made no excep
tion for the viable unborn.
On the other hand, the Je.fferson court was not without prece
dent in its decision to include the unborn within the meaning of
child. In Hoener v. Bertinato,101 a New Jersey Superior Court held
that nothing in the New Jersey statute conferring jurisdiction on the
92. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301(a)(1) (1981).
94. Id. § 24A-401(c)(I).
95. 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977).
96. Id. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
97. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(a) (West 1968). The Ditlrick court ruled
that although the word "child" possibly could be read to include the unborn, and that
such an amendment might even be desirable, "[w)e decline by judicial amendment to do
that which, at the time of enactment, the Legislature did not contemplate." 80 Mich.
App. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
98. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
99. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
100. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915. In Reyes, a pregnant woman used heroin
during the final months of pregnancy and consequently her twins were born addicted to
the drug. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
101. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).

140

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:125

juvenile court 102 prevented its application to the unborn. 103 The is
sue in Hoener was similar to that presented in the other cases: inter
pretation of the statutory term "child."I04 The New Jersey Juvenile
Court exercised its jurisdiction and granted custody of a fetus to the
Child Welfare Department to assure that it would receive life-saving
transfusions immediately upon birth in order to prevent potentially
fatal blood RH complications. lOS Similarly, in People v. Ester
gard,106 the Colorado Childrens Code was construed liberally so as
to include the unborn.107 In this way, the court was able to imple
ment the Code's provisions for determining parental identity even
though the "child" in question was yet unborn. lOS
The Je.fferson court did not cite either of these cases in its deci
sion to grant the juvenile court jurisdiction over the fetus. The court
relied instead on the fact that the fetus was viable, thus invoking the
Roe v. Wade lO9 emphasis on viability.1l0 While it is true that Roe
would establish a compelling interest in the life of the viable fetus, III
it does not follow that this compelling interest should then mandate
elevation of the legal status of the fetus to that of a statutory child.
The Je.fferson court gave the fetus the same legal protection as that
given to a newborn child, but in order to do so, relied on rationale
borrowed from the very decision which denied the fetus constitu
tional protection as a person. It is unlikely that the United States
Supreme Court in Roe intended for the viability criterion to extend
to such a broad measure of statutory protection. I12
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-9,2-11 (West 1976).
103. 67 N.J. Super. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144.
104. See id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 143-44.
105. Id. at 525, 171 A.2d at 145. The Hoener court stated that there was nothing to
preclude the application of the statute to the unborn. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144. Com
pare this approach with the statutory analysis of Justice Smith in Jtjferson who, in dis
agreeing with the majority on the jurisdictional issue, stated in a footnote that statutory
terminology should be given its ordinary meaning. 247 Ga. at 92 n.l, 274 S.E.2d at 462
n.1 (Smith, J., concurring).
106. 457 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1969).
107. Id. at 699.
108. Id. Both Hoener and Estergard pre-dated Roe, and neither made any distinc
tion on the basis of viability. It is questionable, then, as to whether their holdings would
now apply to pre-viable fetuses. In any event, one commentator has found a recent unre
ported case involving facts similar to Jtjferson in which a Colorado juvenile court, ap
parently on authority of Estergard, assumed jurisdiction to order a pregnant woman to
submit to a caesarean section to save the life of her fetus. See Bowes & Selgestad, supra
note 39, at 212.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
Ill. 410 U.S. at 163.
112. While the Roe Court specifically says that a state may pass regulations for the
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Whether the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was necessary to
achieve the end result was not an issue specifically addressed by the
Jefferson court. Justice Smith, in his concurring opinion, implied
that jurisdiction was not necessary to achieve the end result. He
viewed the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as inconsistent with the
jurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile Court Code,1l3 but con
curred in result, stating that in view of the life and death emergency,
the trial court's lie. , superior court's] action was a proper exercise of
its equitable powers with respect to both the mother and the fetus. 114
As he further explained: "This is a case of first impression, and the
trial court, in an attempt to cover all possible ground, rendered its
judgment 'both as a Juvenile Court and under the broad powers of
the Superior Court of Butts County.' "115 In doing so, however, the
court set a precedent that may be difficult to manage in the future. I 16
2.

The Decision to Order Surgery

In spite of the differences of opinion on the jurisdictional issue,
all of the justices concurred in the ultimate decision to order the cae
sarean section. The majority and both concurring opinions cited Ra
leigh as primary authority.1l7 Raleigh, although nearly twenty years
old, was, in the court's opinion, still valid authority for a case such as
Jefferson in that both cases involved viable fetuses, clear life and
death circumstances, and treatment not detrimental to the mother. lIS
Conceivably, prior to Roe, the Raleigh holding, ordering treatment
against the pregnant mother's wishes, might have been extended to
cases in which the fetus was not yet viable or where the recom
mended treatment might jeopardize the mother's life. 119 However,
protection of fetal life which has reached viability, 410 U.S. at 163, the extent of such
regulations clearly is limited by the Court's further holdings that a state may not prevent
an abortion necessary for the life and health of the mother, id. at 163-64, and that a fetus
is not a constitutional "person." Id. at 158. It is apparent that the Roe Court did not
intend the legal status of even a viable fetus to be equivalent to that of a live-born person.
113. Justice Smith first analyzed the relevant statutory language setting forth the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. 247 Ga. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 461. For these statutory
provisions, see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Then, unlike the other justices,
he concluded "I believe the legislature intended that the juvenile courts exercise jurisdic
tion only where a child has seen the light of day. I am aware of no 'child deprivation'
proceeding wherein the 'child' was unborn." Id. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 461-62 (citation and
footnote omitted).
114. 247 Ga. 92, 274 S.E.2d at 462.
115. Id.
116. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
117. 247 Ga. at 89-91, 274 S.E.2d at 460-61.
118. Id. at 86-87, 274 S.E.2d at 458; 42 N.J. at 422-23, 201 A.2d at 537-38.
119. Although the fetus in Raleigh was viable and the treatment actually beneficial
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Roe's holding that a mother may choose to abort a pre-viable fe
tus, 120 and that even a viable fetus may be aborted when necessary to
save the mother, I2I implicitly ruled out any such extension. 122
Perhaps owing to the obvious life and death nature of both
cases, the Jefferson and Raleigh courts were satisfied with their deci
sions, and neither court felt compelled to present an in depth discus
sion of the basic underlying issues. 123 Consequently, these opinions
provide little guidance for other courts dealing with the more diffi
cult cases certain to arise in the future. 124 While Jefferson indicated
that the process of judicial resolution was one of balancing,125 the
court failed to explain the mechanics of this balancing test or how it
might be applied in similar but varying factual situations.
Under the traditional analysis, a competent adult patient's right
to refuse treatment is subject to balancing against competing state
to the health of the mother, 42 N.J. at 422-24,201 A.2d at 537-38, nothing in the opinion
makes clear that these matters were dispositive to the decision to order treatment.
120. 410 U.S. at 163.
121. Id. at 163-64.
122. The Roe opinion is devoid of any language which would diminish Raleigh's
vitality as applied to a factually analogous case such as Jefferson.
123. The Jefferson court's per curiam opinion cites only three cases, namely, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson,
42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), and a third case, Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145
(Ky. 1969). In Strunk, the parents of an incompetent adult sought judicial authorization
to remove a kidney from the incompetent for transplantation to his brother, who was
dying of kidney disease. Id. at 145-46. The Jefferson court does not explain its reliance
on Strunk. The case was simply cited with the others at the end of the opinion. 247 Ga.
at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460. The case was not, as one might think, cited as authority for the
decision to order surgery on one person for the sake of another. In Strunk, the decision
to order surgery was based largely on the fact that the surgery was in the best interests of
the incompetent kidney donor himself, who, according to psychiatrists, was emotionally
dependent on his brother and would have been devastated by his death. 445 S.W.2d at
146. It can be surmised that the case was included instead because of its holding that the
court in fact had power to issue such an order with respect to an incompetent. Id. at 149.
The Jefferson court apparently viewed Strunk as precedent for its exercise of judicial
power over the viable fetus. Whether Strunk was valid precedent for Jefferson in this
regard is doubtful because the question of judicial authority over a live-born incompe
tent and that of judicial authority over a viable fetus are quite distinct. The legal status
of the two beings are not the same, and the Jefferson court, by citing Strunk, essentially
begged the question with regard to the fetus' legal status. In other words, the court took
as an assumption that the viable fetus' legal status was in fact the same as that of a live
born incompetent.
124. For a hypothetical example of a more difficult case involving court-ordered
. treatment for the protection of a fetus see infra note 130.
125. The Jefferson court stated: "The Court finds that the intrusion involved into
the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson and her husband, John W. Jefferson, is outweighed by the
duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death
before being given an opportunity to live." 247 Ga. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
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interests. 126 In applying this balancing test to a pregnant woman's
refusal of treatment necessary to save the life of a viable fetus, it is
clear from Roe that the state may assert a compelling interest in the
life of the viable fetus. 127 It would be erroneous to assume from this,
however, that each time the life of a viable fetus is threatened by
some medical problem, the mother's right to refuse treatment auto
matically will be subordinated, regardless of other circumstances.
The requirements of viability and a compelling state interest are sim
ply prerequisites for the state to intervene on behalf of the fetus. The
balancing test analysis must also reflect other factors, such as the
degree to which the treatment enhances the fetus' chances of survival
and the potential effect of the treatment upon the life and health of
the mother.
The Jefferson court paid particularly close attention to the fact
that the fetus' chance of survival was greatly enhanced by the sur
gery.128 The court clearly would have been hesitant to order the
treatment over the mother's refusal had the treatment only slightly
increased the fetus' chance of survival. 129 Thus the state, in addition
to showing the viability prerequisite has been met, must also demon
strate that the means chosen, in this case the proposed treatment, is
sufficiently related to the goal of saving the fetus' life. The better
prognosis the treatment offers, the closer that relationship will be.
How close this relationship must be for a court to order the treat
ment is uncertain. In Jefferson, the relationship was so close, consid
ering the medical statistics, that the court did not have to wrestle
with the problem. 130
Another factor that must enter into the balancing test is the pos
sible risk or benefit of the treatment to the mother. Certainly, if the
126. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
128. See 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
129. Generally, courts dealing with medical refusal cases have been reluctant to
speculate as to what the outcome of a particular case might have been had the medical
statistics been different from those actually confronting the court. Nevertheless, it is logi
cally sound that in a balancing approach, a patient's right to refuse treatment is more
likely to prevail if the proposed treatment only slightly improves the adverse prognosis.
130. One can easily imagine other factual situations similar to Jifferson in which
the state's interest in the treatment might not be so strong, thus making judicial determi
nation more difficult. For example, the fetus' chances of survival might be 25% without
treatment and only 50% with treatment. Under these circumstances, the mother's right to
refuse treatment might outweigh the state's interest in ordering it. This is not to suggest
that the state would no longer have a compelling interest in the life of the fetus. Rather,
the state would no longer seek to vindicate that interest against the mother's rights in
view of the questionable benefit that the treatment would offer.
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treatment jeopardized the life or health of the mother, it could not be
ordered. This would be inconsistent with Roe's holding that even a
viable fetus can be aborted when the life and health of the mother
are at stake. 131 Thus, in those situations in which the mother's right
to life and health are invoked, her rights cannot be outweighed by a
state interest. If, on the other hand, the condition which threatens
the fetus also threatens the mother, and the proposed treatment in
creases the mother's chance of survival as well as that of the fetus, a
sufficient state interest may emerge from a traditional analysis of
medical refusal cases. For example, a mother might have depen
dents whose welfare would be jeopardized by her death.132
Due to the wide variety of possible factual settings and the com
plexity of the interests which may arise when a pregnant woman re
fuses medical treatment, a case-by-case analysis is necessary. In
spite of the difficulty of obtaining a judicial decision in what will
usually be an emergency situation, this approach provides a degree
of assurance that all factors are given due consideration. 133 A
mechanical approach, such as a statutory provision eliminating the
requirement of the mother's consent once it is determined that cer
tain specified medical conditions are present, 134 might be an expedi
ent but would severely undercut the appropriate consideration of the
rights of the mother. The constitutional and common law bases of
an adult's right to refuse treatment must remain the focal point and
should never be disregarded by such a rigid rule.

v.

IMPLICATIONS

The most significant implications of Jejferson lie more in the
grant ofjurisdiction over the viable fetus to the juvenile court than in
the decision to order treatment upon the mother. 135 The Jejferson
court, as the highest court of the state, granted the viable unborn an
enormous measure of statutory protection. 136 This is unlike Raleigh,
in which the court accomplished essentially the same end but did so
131.

410

u.s. at

163-64.
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.

132.
133. Medical refusal cases have traditionally employed a case-by-case balancing
approach. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
134. This is one of several alternative solutions examined and rejected by Shriner.
See Shriner, supra note 39, at 519.
135. See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
136. The Georgia Code section which deals with jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
now carries an annotation with the heading "Unborn Child" in which Jt1ferson is cited.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301 (1981).
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without invoking any statute or reinterpreting statutory language. 137
The Je.fferson court conceivably opened the door to allow the
juvenile court to invoke its unique powers over a viable fetus. It
would need only be determined that the fetus is neglected, and the
juvenile court technically would have the same ability to issue orders
as it would in the case of a live-born child. The juvenile court's ju
risdiction might even be invoked absent any life or death threat to
the fetus.138 Justice Smith may have foreseen such implications
when he contended that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should
not extend to the unborn. 139
Two factors may be asserted which militate against such impli
cations: First, the trial court expressed doubt as to whether the pow
ers of the juvenile court, standing alone, were sufficient to order the
relief sought. 140 Stated another way, the court was unsure whether
the juvenile court had any power with respect to the mother. The
court therefore issued its judgment in a two-part fashion, issuing one
order in its role as juvenile court with respect to the fetus, and an
other in its role of superior court with respect to the mother. 141 The
Supreme Court of Georgia, simply restating the trial court's opinion,
did not answer the question of whether the juvenile court's power
alone would have been sufficient. Consequently, a suit filed in Geor
gia Juvenile Court on behalf of a "neglected" fetus might result in an
unenforceable order since such an order would necessarily intrude
on the rights of the mother, over whom the court definitively would
not have any power. It makes no difference that the juvenile court
might grant custody of the fetus to a state agency. Such a gesture is
simply a legal concept with regard to the unborn, since there is no
actual physical separation. In reality, one cannot treat the fetus
without treating the mother. Thus, the Je.fferson court's grant of ju
risdiction to the juvenile court was rather self-limiting.
Second, even if the juvenile court had power over both the fetus
and the mother, there would still be some question as to whether
such power would ever be used in anything less than a life and death
situation. Indeed, even in those cases where parents have withheld
137. In Raleigh, the case came on appeal from the court of Chancery. 42 N.J. at
421,201 A.2d at 537.
138. For example, the power of the juvenile court might be used to compel prena
tal care or to prevent the mother from engaging in activities potentially hazardous to the
fetus.
139. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
140. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text.
141. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
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consent to treatment upon a live-born child, courts have not always
ordered treatment where the life of a child was not immediately en
dangered. 142 It is even less likely that courts in a non-life-threaten
ing situation would order treatment requiring an actual physical
invasion of the mother.
The Jeff"erson court's decision to give the viable fetus the protec
tion of the Juvenile Court Code was a significant judicial amend
ment to the Code's jurisdictional provisions. Considering the
complexity of the issues involved, the matter deserved much more
careful and painstaking consideration than the court was able to give
it in an emergency proceeding such as this. Since, as Justice Smith
pointed out, the powers of the juvenile court might not have been
necessary under the circumstances of the case,143 the court more ap
propriately should have avoided the issue, if possible, and deferred
its final determination until a time at which both parties had been
given a full opportunity to carefully prepare and present their argu
ments. Jeff"erson, at the very least, has laid the foundation for further
intrusions into the lives of pregnant women regardless of whether the
full implications are realized immediately.
As a final matter, it remains to be answered which line of medi
cal refusal cases is presently most analagous to a case such as Jeff"er
son: specifically, those cases in which the treatment is for the
unwilling patient's own life and health,l44 or the parental consent
cases in which the patient is a live-born child whose parent with
holds consent. 145 The legal dilemma presented by a pregnant wo
man's refusal of medical treatment cannot be resolved satisfactorily
by either line of authority. 146 From a practical standpoint, however,
the outcome of such a case could be greatly influenced by the attor
ney's ability to analogize the factual situation to one line of authority
over the other. In the first line of authority, the general rule is that a
competent adult may refuse treatment even in life-threatening cir
cumstances unless the state can demonstrate a sufficient interest to
overcome the patient's rights. 147 In the parental consent cases, how
ever, the general rule has been the opposite: A parent cannot, on any
basis, prevent a child from receiving life-saving treatment.'48
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
247 Ga. at 91-92, 274 S.E.2d at 461-62.
See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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The Jf!.fferson court was, at best, equivocal in the matter. It
granted the juvenile court jurisdiction over the fetus, thus allowing
custody of the fetus to be awarded to a consenting guardian. In this
sense, the Jf!.fferson court treated the fetus as a live-born child and
analyzed the case as if it were within the parental consent line of
authority. On the other hand, the court clearly implied that the juve
nile court might not have any ability to order treatment upon the
mother, thus leaving the juvenile court powerless in the matter. 149 It
is apparent that the court never lost sight of the fact that the treat
ment was not upon the child at all, but rather upon the mother, who
has a well established right to refuse treatment upon her own body.
The court tacitly recognized that as long as the treatment required an
actual physical invasion of the mother against her will, the parental
consent cases alone were not controlling and that the line of cases
construing an adult's right to refuse treatment also played a part in
the analysis. The opinion, however, made no attempt to explain how
these lines of authority should be applied to the facts of Jf!.fferson.
Instead, the court declined to use case citations falling squarely
within either line of authority and thus avoided the issue.
The answer to the problem of applicable precedent seems to lie
not in Jf!.fferson, but rather in Roe .150 The fetus, viable or otherwise,
is simply not the legal equivalent of a live-born child. It has no con
stitutional right to live, as does a live-born child and, therefore, any
attempt to analogize the two in this setting would be largely inappro
priate. This, taken together with the inescapable fact that the treat
ment involves a bodily invasion of the mother, makes clear that the
refusal of treatment cases, rather than the parental consent cases, is
by far the more a~alagous under present law. Indeed, Justice Hill, in
his concurring opinion, cites cases and secondary sources specifically
from the line of authority construing a competent adult's right to
refuse treatment. 151 While it might be true that the enactment of a
"Right to Life" bill l52 would move the analysis somewhat closer to
the parental consent line of cases, that is, by giving the fetus full
constitutional status as a person, such is not the state of our law at
149. See supra notes 85, 140-41 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
151. See 247 Ga. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460. Justice Hill cites, for example, In re
Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) and In re Yetter, 62 Pa.
D. & c. 2d 619 (1973). He also cites Kamezis, supra note 12.
152. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. REP. No. 3225,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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present and the relevance of those cases remains minimal at best
today.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Court ordered medical treatment involves many complex and
controversial issues. The delicate balancing process of judicial reso
lution seldom has been easy. In the case of a pregnant woman's re
fusal of treatment, the process is further complicated by a lack of
controlling precedent in medical refusal law and an unsettled body
of law concerning the legal status of the unborn. The Jif.ferson
court's ultimate decision to order treatment to save the life of a via
ble fetus nevertheless came as no surprise in view of the compelling
medical statistics present in the case and recent emphasis placed on
viability by the Supreme Court of the United States in Roe. Perhaps
owing to the emergency nature of the proceedings, however, the Jif
ferson court failed to articulate clearly the theoretical basis of its de
cision and thus provided little guidance for courts dealing with more
difficult cases in the future.
The most unusual aspect of Jefferson was the court's decision to
grant the juvenile court jurisdiction over the viable fetus. On the
basis of viability, the court gave the fetus legal standing as a statu
tory "child." This was a large grant of legal protection in view of
Roe's holding that a fetus cannot be a "person" in the constitutional
sense. The decision was motivated by a desire to assure that suffi
cient judicial power existed to order treatment on the mother for the
sake of the fetus. The means chosen, however, may have been un
necessary and overbroad. The court no doubt was moved by the
extreme circumstances of this unusual case and was determined to
reach its desired result.
Richard L. Manner

